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Background: Pseudomonas aeruginosa healthcare outbreaks can be time consuming and
difficult to investigate. Guidance does not specify which typing technique is most practical
for decision-making.
Aim: To explore the usefulness of whole-genome sequencing (WGS) in the investigation of
a P. aeruginosa outbreak, describing how it compares with pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) and variable number tandem repeat (VNTR) analysis.
Methods: Six patient isolates and six environmental samples from an intensive care unit
(ICU) positive for P. aeruginosa over two years underwent VNTR, PFGE and WGS.
Findings: VNTR and PFGE were required to fully determine the potential source of
infection and rule out others. WGS results unambiguously distinguished linked isolates,
giving greater assurance of the transmission route between wash-hand basin water and
two patients, supporting the control measures employed.
Conclusion:WGS provided detailed information without the need for further typing. When
allied to epidemiological information, WGS can be used to understand outbreak situations
rapidly and with certainty. Implementation of WGS in real-time would be a major advance
in day-to-day practice. It could become a standard of care as it becomes more widespread
due to its reproducibility and lower costs.
ª 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).lls Hospital & Medical
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Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a Gram-negative bacterium that
is ubiquitous in moist hospital environments [1,2]. It is an
opportunistic pathogen in immunocompromised patients that
causes a wide range of infections [2e6]. Hospital water can be
a source of outbreaks in neonatal units and both adult and
paediatric intensive care units (ICUs), colonizing and formingHealthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
Table I
Results of microbiological detection for Pseudomonas aeruginosa
in water samples (pre- and post-flush) from water outlets in the
intensive care unit (ICU)
Source Pseudomonas count
(cfu/mL) pre-flush
samples
Pseudomonas
count (cfu/mL)
post-flush samples
Ice machine >100 >100
Domestic service
room WHB
37 1
Bed 7 WHB >100 28
Bed 8 WHB 41 0
Kitchen sink 0 0
Kitchen drinking
water tap
0 0
Kitchen hydroboil 0 0
Domestic service
room sink
0 0
Ventilator room sink 0 0
ICU entrance WHB 0 0
Chilled drinking water
dispenser
0 0
Ward area WHB 1 0 0
Ward area WHB 2 0 0
Bed 4 WHB 0 0
WHB, wash-hand basin; cfu, colony-forming units.
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[2,7e13]. Routes of transmission include environment to pa-
tient e either directly from contaminated water or splashes
from water outlets, or indirectly from contaminated hands or
equipment. Transmission from colonized patients to the envi-
ronment and between patients can occur during clinical pro-
cedures that create aerosols. Infection can be acquired and
arise from the patient’s own gut microbiota after pseudomo-
nads have been selected out by antibiotics [14]. Multi-drug
resistance in P. aeruginosa is common, and the mortality rate
in invasive infections is up to 29%; therefore, controlling the
spread of this organism is important [15,16].
Differentiating strains is essential to identify routes of
transmission of organisms, identify reservoirs and plot poten-
tial chains of transmission. Variable number tandem repeat
(VNTR) typing, a polymerase-chain-reaction-based method,
represents an improvement in speed and reproducibility over
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) whilst providing a
similar level of discrimination [1,16]. Turton et al. suggested
that isolates similar by VNTR with no strong epidemiological
links between them should be confirmed by PFGE [1]. Newer
methods of whole-genome sequencing (WGS) offer the poten-
tial for greater resolution and reproducibility, and may be
faster at identifying strains in an outbreak and deducing the
lines of transmission. WGS has been used in the investigation of
a variety of bacterial outbreaks and, in some instances, has
been used for the investigation of pseudomonas outbreaks. To
the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to report data
comparing the utility of rapid WGS with the current typing
methods (VNTR and PFGE) [17e27].Materials and methods
Four patients were identified as colonized or infected with a
strain of P. aeruginosa with an unusual resistance profile in an
ICU at Ninewells Hospital, Dundee between January 2013 and
May 2013. A case finding exercise was undertaken using the
definition: ‘a sample positive with P. aeruginosa resistant to
imipenem isolated from a patient admitted to ICU since 2012’.
The case finding exercise yielded a further five patients;
however, only two patients had isolates that had been stored
by the hospital laboratory. As such, six patient isolates were
available for further testing. Water (pre- and post-flush sam-
ples) was sampled from 14 water outlets in the ICU for
P. aeruginosa on 16th May 2013 (Table I). Monitoring swabs
were also taken from 11 water outlet drains on the same day
[domestic service room wash-hand basin (WHB), Bed 7 WHB,
Bed 8 WHB, kitchen sink, kitchen drinking water tap, domestic
service room sink, ventilator room sink, ICU entrance WHB,
ward area WHB 1, ward area WHB 2, Bed 4 WHB]. Caldicott
guardian approval was gained in order to protect patient
confidentiality and enable appropriate information sharing.Samples and susceptibility testing
All clinical specimens had been collected during routine
care and processed at the Department of Medical Microbiology
Laboratory, Ninewells Hospital. Environmental samples from
each water outlet drain were incubated aerobically on Mac-
Conkey agar at 37C and Pseudomonas CN Selective Agar (Oxoid
Ltd, Basingstoke, UK) at 35C, and examined after 24 and 48 h.VITEK 2 (bioMe´rieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France) was used for or-
ganism identification and antibiotic susceptibility testing using
minimum inhibitory concentrations according to the European
Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing. An external
contractor sampled all water outlets for P. aeruginosa using
pre- and post-flush samples. Water samples were processed by
a laboratory approved by the UK Accreditation Service within 4
h of collection.
VNTR and PFGE
Environmental and patient isolates were sent to the Anti-
microbial Resistance and Healthcare Associated Infections
Reference Unit, Public Health England, Colindale for typing
(VNTR typing at nine loci and PFGE), as described previously [1].
WGS and phylogenetic analysis
Isolates were stored on beads at 80C until processed. The
cultures were recultured by the Infection Group, School of
Medicine, University of St Andrews. DNA was extracted using
QIAamp DNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany). The quality of
the DNA was measured as A280 nm/A260 nm ratio on NanoVue
(GE Healthcare, Little Chalfont, UK), and the concentration of
double-stranded DNA was assessed using dsDNA BR Kit on a
Qubit 2.0 fluorometer (Thermo Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA,
USA). One-nanogram samples of DNA were used to construct
the libraries with Nextera XT kit (Illumina Inc, San Diego, CA,
USA). The normalized libraries were sequenced using a 2  250
pair-end read of a 500-cycle v2 kit on a MiSeq platform (Illu-
mina Inc, San Diego, CA, USA) using a resequencing workflow.
The Illumina sequences generated were deposited in the Eu-
ropean Nucleotide Archive under the study accession number
ERP023446. Using SMALT (Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute;
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initially mapped to the chromosome of P. aeruginosa PAO1
(accession number AE004091), and single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) were identified as described previously [28].
In addition, the chromosomes of a representative selection of
P. aeruginosa strains e B136-33 (accession number CP004061),
DK2 (CP003149), LES431 (CP006937), LESB58 (FM209186), M18
(CP002496), MTB-1 (CP006853), NCGM2.S1 (AP012280), PA1
(CP004054), PA38182 (HG530068), RP73 (CP006245), SCV20265
(CP006931), UCBPP-PA14 (CP000438), VRFPA04 (CP008739) and
YL84 (CP007147) e were used to provide a wider context for
the hospital isolates. For each of these additional P. aeruginosa
strains, artificial 250bp pair-end reads fastq files were gener-
ated using a python script. The generated fastq files were
mapped along with the outbreak isolates to the chromosome of
P. aeruginosa PAO1 and SNPs. Recombination was detected in
the genomes using Gubbins (http://sanger-pathogens.github.
io/gubbins/) [29].
The core genome regions of the PAO1 and UCBPP-PA14
chromosome were defined by human curation using pairwise
Blast comparisons with each other and other P. aeruginosa
strains [30]. The Artemis Comparison Tool was used to visualize
the comparisons [31]. SNPs falling inside mobile genetic ele-
ments were excluded from the core genome, as well as those
falling in regions predicted by Gubbins to have occurred by
recombination. Phylogenetic trees were constructed sepa-
rately using RAxML v7.0.4 for all sites in the core genomes
containing SNPs, using a general time reversible model with a
gamma correction for among-site rate variation [32,33]. For a
higher resolution phylogeny, ICU isolates that clustered on a
branch with UCBPP-PA14 (CP000438) were mapped to this
sequence as described above.
Results
Epidemiology
The ICU ward had been free from outbreaks in 2013. It was
an eight-bed unit of a teaching hospital with approximately 950
acute beds. The infection prevention and control team (IPCT)
were initially concerned that four patients were colonized/
infected with a strain of P. aeruginosawith the same resistance
profile between January 2013 and May 2013. All patient isolates
were sensitive to gentamicin, ciprofloxacin, piperacillin-
tazobactam and ceftazidime, and resistant to imipenem;
most patients had received carbapenem treatment at some
point during their admission. Patients had a mixture of di-
agnoses on admission.
Fluids such as bed bath water and endotracheal aspirate
(ETA) were disposed of in the wash-hand basins. The IPCT
visited the ward and gave advice in line with national guidance
for the appropriate disposal of these potentially contaminated
fluids. Procedures for the decontamination of two small pieces
of equipment e the ventilator flow sensor and temperature
probes e were also reviewed. These items were decontami-
nated by immersion in a sink filled with hot soapy water. This
method was discontinued and sporicidal wipes were used after
ascertaining their suitability with the manufacturer. The
decontamination sink in the back room was found to have
crusting on taps; these taps were replaced. This was the sink in
which probes were decontaminated. WHBs were supplied byPillar mixer taps with integral thermostats (Figure A, see online
supplementary material). The flow from the tap ran close to
the sink drains, causing splashing. Taps with flow straighteners
were at risk of contamination by biofilm. To become more
compliant with National Health Service building regulations,
these were removed and sink basins were replaced to remove
overflow drains. The ice machine was supplied by cold water
via a flexible hose. This was identified as an area where bac-
teria could proliferate; the hose was therefore replaced by a
Water Regulations Advisory Scheme (WRAS)-approved hose.
Localized cleaning of all affected outlets was performed. An
increased flushing regimen was introduced to remove any
biofilm that was present within the affected outlets. The rec-
ommended flushing regimen was twice per day for 2 min at a
time. Remediation works were successful as there was no
growth of Pseudomonas spp. on repeat testing of outlets and
water following these changes.
Antibiotic susceptibility testing
All isolates were confirmed to be P. aeruginosa, and five
isolates had an indistinguishable antibiotic susecptibility
pattern (Patient A, abdominal drain fluid; Patient B, ETA; Pa-
tient D, ETA; Patient E, ETA; Bed 8, WHB).
Environmental investigation
Water (pre- and post-flush samples) was sampled from 14
water outlets in the ICU for P. aeruginosa (Table I). Four areas
were found to be positive: ice machine (pre- and post-flush),
domestic service room WHB (pre- and post-flush), Bed 7 WHB
(pre- and post-flush), and Bed 8 WHB (pre-flush). The initial
results suggested that the pseudomonas contamination was
most likely local to the outlets as the post-flush samples yiel-
ded much lower growth results and negative results compared
with the pre-flush samples. Monitoring swabs were also taken
from 11 water outlet drains, and three were positive (Bed 7
WHB water outlet drain, Bed 4 WHB water outlet drain and ICU
entrance WHB water outlet drain).
VNTR and PFGE analysis
VNTR analysis of the isolates from the ICU identified that six
isolates belonged to a cluster of related profiles, which
included Patients B and D and the four environmental isolates
from Bed 8 WHB water, Bed 4 WHB water outlet drain, Bed 7
WHB water outlet drain and kitchen ice machine water
(Table II). All of these isolates had VNTR profiles that were
similar to the PA14 strain, one of the most abundant clonal
complexes in the P. aeruginosa population, which can be
readily isolated from aquatic sources causing infections in
humans [34]. The close relationship of these isolates in the
PA14 cluster suggested that these isolates may be part of an
outbreak. In contrast, the isolates from Patients A, C, E and F
had distinct VNTR profiles, both from one another and the PA14
cluster, and also from the remaining environmental samples,
suggesting that these were unlinked and therefore could be
ruled out of the outbreak.
PFGE was used to distinguish the PA14 cluster isolates.
Analysis of the banding pattern divided the isolates into three
distinct subtypes designated NINE04PA-1 (Bed 8 WHB water,
Table II
Variable number tandem repeat (VNTR) profiles of Pseudomonas
aeruginosa isolates from the intensive care unit (ICU)
Source Date of sampling VNTR
Bed 4 WHB water
outlet drain
16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,11
Bed 7 WHB water
outlet drain
16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,11
Bed 8 WHB water 16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,12
Domestic service
room WHB water
16/05/2013 12,3,6,3,1,4,14,5,10
ICU entrance WHB
water outlet drain
16/05/2013 12,3,-,3,1,4,14,5,10
Ice machine water 16/05/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,14
Patient A abdominal
drain fluid
11/03/2012 12,6,7,5,3,4,8,1,11
Patient B ETA 21/09/2012 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,12
Patient C ETA 04/01/2013 11,2,6,-,3,6,6,6,12
Patient D ETA 15/04/2013 12,2,1,5,5,2,4,5,12
Patient E ETA 11/05/2013 12,4,-,-,3,1,6,4,13
Patient F ETA 05/05/2013 12,2,-,3,2,2,-,5,6
WHB, wash-hand basin; ETA, endotracheal aspirate.
Patient E ETA
Patient A abdominal drain fluid
ICU entrance WHB drain
Domestic service room WHB
Patient F ETA
Patient C ETA
Bed 7 WHB drain
Bed 4 WHB drain
Bed 8 WHB
Patient D ETA
Patient B ETA
Kitchen ice machine
PA1
PA01
PA38182
LES431
LESB58
SCV20265
RP73
DK2
YL84
MTB-1
NCGM2
B136-33
VRFPA04
UCBPP-PA14
12,000 SNPs
M18
Figure 1. Phylogenomic analysis of Pseudomonas aeruginosa isolate
nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) identified by mapping to the PAO1 re
the right contains a maximum likelihood phylogeny of the intensive c
mapped to the PA14 reference genome of UCBPP-PA14R. The tree was
arisen by recombination (the number of SNPs associated with recombi
identified). Scale bars illustrating the relative SNPs’ distances of the p
intensive care unit; WHB, wash-hand basin.
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water outlet drain) and NINE04PA-1” (kitchen ice machine
water). There were clear and definite band differences be-
tween the ice machine isolate and the patient isolates.Genome sequencing and phylogenetic reconstruction
WGS and phylogenetic analysis were performed in order to
resolve the fine-scale relationship between outbreak isolates
and explore epidemiological links between the isolates
(Figure 1). In order to provide a wider genetic context and a
snapshot of diversity within the species, 15 additional
P. aeruginosa genome sequences from EMBL nucleotide data-
base were included in the analysis. For this overview of the
P. aeruginosa population, the WGS reads of the isolates were
mapped to the chromosome of the reference strain PA01 [25].
In total, 182,476 SNP sites were identified amongst all analysed
isolates and revealed a diverse population structure,
throughout which the ICU isolates were distributed. The cluster
of isolates identified by VNTR as belonging to the PA14 clone
formed a distinct clade in the phylogenetic tree that included
the reference isolate UCBPP-PA14, which belonged to the PA14
clone. The next closest isolates to the PA14 cluster were thosePatient D ETA
Patient B ETA
Bed 8 WHB
Bed 4 WHB drain
Bed 7 WHB drain
Kitchen ice machine
2719
61
1784
UCBPP-PA14R
20SNPs
s. Maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree built with core single
ference genome is presented on the left of the figure. The box on
are unit isolates belonging to the PA14 clone, where reads were
built with core SNPs, excluding SNPs identified in regions that had
nation is given in red text above the branches on which they were
hylogenetic trees are displayed. ETA, endotracheal aspirate; ICU,
B.J. Parcell et al. / Journal of Hospital Infection 98 (2018) 282e288286belonging to Patient C ETA and Patient F ETA, and differed from
the cluster by approximately 49,000 SNPs and approximately
50,000 SNPs, respectively.
In order to provide greater resolution for the relationship of
the PA14 cluster isolates, the WGS reads were remapped to the
reference chromosome of UCBPP-PA14 [26]. This isolate was
genetically closer to the outbreak isolates than PAO1, and
therefore remapping to this isolate’s chromosome would pro-
vide increased genomic coverage and consequently greater
resolution. Initial phylogenetic analysis of the SNP data map-
ped to UCBPP-PA14 differentiated the isolates into two sepa-
rate clusters and a further outlier that were each distinguished
by over 1000 SNPs: one cluster containing Patient D ETA, Pa-
tient B ETA and Bed 8 WHB water, which was distinguished from
the second cluster containing Bed 4 WHB water outlet drain
isolate and Bed 7 WHB water outlet drain isolate by 4515 SNPs,
which in turn was distinguished from the kitchen ice machine
water isolate by 1852 SNPs. Analysis of the distribution of SNPs
in the chromosome identified regions of high SNP density,Antibiogram (48 h) VNTR (2 days) 
Bed 8
A
B
D
E
Bed 8
Bed 4
Bed 7
Ice machine
B
D
Bed 4
Bed 7
DSR
ICU entrance
Ice machine
F
C
DSR
ICU entrance
A
C
E
F
Figure 2. Overview of conventional typing and genomic analysis. Env
outlet drain; Bed 7, Bed 7 WHB water outlet drain; Bed 8, Bed 8 WHB
entrance WHB water outlet drain; ice machine, water. Patient sampl
aspirate (ETA); C, Patient C ETA; D, Patient D ETA; E, Patient E ETA;
green, strains deemed ‘out’ by typing. VNTR, variable number tand
genome sequencing; ICU, intensive care unit.indicative of this variation arising by homologous recombina-
tion. Utilizing Gubbins to detect potential regions of recombi-
nation identified five regions that distinguished the PA14 clone
ICU population. Excluding the SNPs in these regions from the
phylogenetic reconstruction reduced the apparent genetic di-
versity of the PA14 group, but still maintained the distinction of
the two clusters and the outlier. In the Patient D ETA, Patient B
ETA and Bed 8 WHB water cluster, the Patient B ETA and Bed 8
WHB water isolates were indistinguishable, and differed from
the Patient D ETA isolate by four SNPs. The minimal genetic
distance between these isolates strongly supports transmission
between the Bed 8 WHB water and Patients D and B, and is
within the range of SNP distances observed in a study that
investigated P. aeruginosa transmission in a hospital setting
[26]. These patients were not in the ICU department at the
same time. An overview of conventional typing and genomic
analysis and the timeline for the delivery of these results is
illustrated in Figure 2.PFGE (7 days)  WGS (≤7 days)
Bed 8
B
D
Bed 8
B
D
Bed 4
Bed 7
Bed 4
Bed 7
Ice Machine Ice machine
E
A
ICU entrance
DSR
C
F
ironmental samples: Bed 4, Bed 4 wash-hand basin (WHB) water
water; DSR, domestic service room WHB water; ICU entrance, ICU
es: A, Patient A abdominal drain fluid; B, Patient B endotracheal
F, Patient F ETA. Light blue, strains deemed ‘in’ by typing; light
em repeat; PFGE, pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; WGS, whole-
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The IPCT had urgent questions to answer: is there an
outbreak, is there a common source, who is involved, how did
the outbreak arise? This study evaluated the relative utility of
typing methods to answer these questions. As one moves from
routine methods of antibiogram through VNTR and PFGE to
WGS, the understanding of the nature of this outbreak becomes
apparent. There is a progressive winnowing of possibly involved
patients and infection sources. The antibiogram showed a
linkage between the Bed 8WHB water and Patients B and D, but
also included Patients A and E. VNTR correctly identified the
two patients who were part of the outbreak, but also identified
several false-positive environmental links. This left the IPCT
considering various routes of transmission; for instance, pa-
tient care using ice machine water. PFGE was required for
complete clarification. The clinical benefit of using WGS in this
situation is that it rapidly provides absolute clarity in dis-
tinguishing the isolates in one step, negating the need for the
IPCT to spend unnecessary time contemplating other scenarios
of how the transmission came about without certainty. In this
situation, this information was combined with epidemiology.
These patients were not in the ICU at the same time, suggesting
that the water supply had acted as a reservoir and source of
ongoing infection.
Recognized interventions to prevent transmission from wa-
ter to patients were effective in preventing further trans-
mission. These included removal of taps with flow
straighteners, replacement of sink basins with overflow drains,
introduction of increased flushing regimen, and monitoring of
water temperature to become fully compliant with national
guidance. The IPCT also reviewed procedures for the decon-
tamination of the ventilator flow sensor and temperature
probes, in addition to making recommendations for the
disposal of potentially contaminated fluids to prevent trans-
mission of organisms from patients to sink drains and distal
ends of taps. ICU staff supported changes to their decontami-
nation practices, and training on the new cleaning protocol for
sinks was also given. Following this, areas were resampled and
it was confirmed that remediation works were successful.
This study has shown that WGS is a potent tool to direct
effective intervention in outbreak situations in comparison to,
and providing additional information to, molecular typing
methods. WGS can provide results within seven days; however,
it should be noted that current start-up costs for this tech-
nology remain high. For WGS to be introduced into routine
clinical microbiology laboratories, investment in infrastructure
including bioinformatics and expertise for the interpretation,
management and storage of data is required. Standard oper-
ating procedures, validation of methods and quality control
measures are in place for VNTR and PFGE testing, and will be
required for WGS to take place in clinical laboratories. The
results are limited by the fact that some isolates were not
stored and not all were recultured successfully. Only one col-
ony was processed from each sample, and this may have
limited assessment of the diversity of Pseudomonas spp. in
patient and environment samples.
WGS would be of particular use when there are no obvious
epidemiological links between the patients, enabling IPCTs to
have timely results using one method. WGS alone provided the
necessary resolution to identify the transmission pathway,demonstrating unequivocally the spread between single water
supply to patients, and eliminating other potential trans-
mission events and sources. Thought should be given as to how
to make these powerful data available routinely in a timely
manner, and in a format that is easily interpretable and clini-
cally relevant. Establishing tools such as sequencing machines
locally can reduce the turnaround time. It is essential that
clinicians develop a new approach to investigate hospital out-
breaks, and escalate to WGS at an early stage to allow accurate
and rapid description of the causes. It is only by using WGS in
real-time that it will be used as a powerful tool to improve
patient outcomes.
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